Illumination rounds shot skyward, catching the patrol boats in their harsh glare. Hickman, Kennedy. All missed, probably because the North Vietnamese had fired too soon. No one was hurt and little damage wasdone in the attack, but intercepted cables suggested a second attack might be imminent. "4 The Pentagon had already released details of the attack, and administration officials had already promised strong action. The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, Admiral Harry D. Felt, agreed and suggested that a U.S. Navy ship could be used to vector 34A boats to their targets.6. This volume deals only with the former. For additional reading, see the recently declassified NSA study by Robert J. Hanyok, Spartans in the Darkness: American SIGINT and the Indochina War, 1945-1975; and Tonkin Gulf and The Escalation of the Vietnam War, by Edward Moise. Americas Vietnam War had begun in earnest. Early Military Career AIDS Brotherhood Symbology The Illuminati Flame . Moises book, however, was based on only the few SIGINT reports he was able to obtain through the Freedom of Information Act. It took only a little imagination to see why the North Vietnamese might connect the two. Media Manipulation. Interpretation by historians as to what exactly did and did not occur during those few days in early August 1964 remains so varied that the wonder is that authors Marolda and Fitzgerald were able themselves to settle on the text. The North Vietnamese didnt buy the distinction; they attacked the USS Maddox. In the days leading up to the first incident of August 2nd, those secret operations had intensified.. These secret intelligence-gathering missions and sabotage operations had begun under the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1961, but in January 1964, the program was transferred to the Defense Department under the control of a cover organization called the Studies and Observations Group (SOG). Johnsonasked for, and received, a resolution of war from the US Congress that led to further escalation in the conflict. 1, p. 646. WebGulf of Tonkin conspiracy. A U.S. Navy SEAL (Sea Air Land) team officer assigned to the SOG maritime operations training staff, Lieutenant James Hawes, led the covert boat fleet out of Da Nang and down the coast 300 miles to Cam Ranh Bay, where they waited out the crisis in isolation. HistoryNet.com is brought to you by HistoryNet LLC, the worlds largest publisher of history magazines. We still seek no wider war.. ", "No," replied McCone. Here's why he couldn't walk away. Both sides claimed successes in the exchange that they did not actually achieve. "13 As far as the State Department was concerned, there was no need to "review" the operations. The SIGINT intercepts also detected that the North Vietnamese coastal radar stations were tracking Maddox and reporting its movements to the outbound torpedo boats. The publicity caused by the Tonkin Gulf incident and the subsequent resolution shifted attention away from covert activities and ended high-level debate over the wisdom of secret operations against North Vietnam. We have ample forces to respond not only to these attacks on these destroyers but also to retaliate, should you wish to do so, against targets on the land, he toldthe president. Mr. Andrad is a Vietnam War historian with the U.S. Army Center of Military History, where he is writing a book on combat operations from 1969 through 1973. (The recent NBC television movie In Love and War had Navy pilot James B. Stockdale flying over the scene at the time saying, "I see nothing"; now a retired vice admiral, Stockdale has reiterated the "phoney attack" charge in writings and public speaking.). On Tuesday morning, Aug. 4, 1964, Defense Secretary Robert McNamara called President Lyndon Johnson with a report about a possible confrontation brewing in southeast Asia. Navy, Of course, none of this was known to Congress, which demanded an explanation for the goings-on in the Tonkin Gulf. Cruising twenty-eight miles offshore in international waters, Maddox was approached by the North Vietnamese. On 3 August, the CIA confirmed that "Hanois naval units have displayed increasing sensitivity to U.S. and South Vietnamese naval activity in the Gulf of Tonkin during the past several months. Shortly thereafter, the Phu Bai station intercepted the signal indicating the North Vietnamese intended to conduct a torpedo attack against the enemy. Phu Bai issued a Critic Reportshort for critical message, meaning one that had priority over all other traffic in the communications system to ensure immediate deliveryto all commands, including Maddox. Or purchase a subscription for unlimited access to real news you can count on. On July 31, 1964, the destroyer USS Maddox commenced a Desoto patrol off North Vietnam. On the afternoon of Aug. 2, three Soviet-built P-4 motor torpedo boats were dispatched to attack the destroyer. The first such Desoto mission was conducted off the North Vietnamese coast in February 1964, followed by more through the spring. At 0354 on 2 August, the destroyer was just south of Hon Me Island. What did and didnt happen in the Gulf of Tonkin on August 2 and 4 has long been in dispute, but the decisions that the Johnson Administration and Congress made based on an interpretation of those events were undeniably monumental. Media reporting on the NSA reports assessments sparked a brief rehash of the old arguments about the Gulf of Tonkin. He also requested air support. 4. Each boat carried a 16-man crew and a 57-mm recoilless rifle, plus machine guns. 302-303. U.S. and South Vietnamese warships intruded into the territorial waters of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and simultaneously shelled: Hon Nieu Island, 4 kilometers off the coast of Thanh Hoa Province [and] Hon Me Island, 12 kilometers off the coast of Thanh Hoa Province." 9/11. Despite Morses doubts, Senate reaction fell in behind the Johnson team, and the question of secret operations was overtaken by the issue of punishing Hanoi for its blatant attack on a U.S. warship in international waters. The first Desoto Mission was conducted by USS Craig (DD-885) in March 1964. The battle was over in 22 minutes. Typically, the missions were carried out by a destroyer specially outfitted with sensitive eavesdropping equipment. The Vietnam War buff will find it fascinating for its wealth of detail carefully set down in understated prose (a welcome relief, I might add, from the hysterical tone that marks much Vietnam War writing). This was almost certainly a reaction to the recent 34A raids. LBJ was looking for a pretext to go to Congress to ask for a resolution that would give him the authority to do basically whatever the hell he wanted to do in Vietnam, without the intense public debate that a declaration of war would have required, says historian Chris Oppe. 1, Vietnam 1964 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992), p. 611. Surprised by the North Vietnamese response, Johnson decided that the United States could not back away from the challenge and directed his commanders in the Pacific to continue with the Desoto missions. Despite McNamaras nimble answers, North Vietnams insistence that there was a connection between 34A and the Desoto patrols was only natural. The basic story line of the Gulf of Tonkin incident is as follows: At approximately 1430 hours Vietnam time on August 2, 1964, USS Maddox (DD-731) detected three North Vietnamese torpedo boats approaching at high speed. The maximum closure distance was originally established at 20 nautical miles, but the commander of the U.S. Meanwhile, by late August 3, the North Vietnamese had learned the condition of their torpedo boats and ordered a salvage tug to recover the damaged craft. But by the end of June, the situation had changed. As a result, the ships offshore were able to collect valuable information on North Vietnamese military capabilities. The Maddox fired againthis time to killhitting the second North Vietnamese boat just as it launched two torpedoes. This is another government conspiracy that's true. The Secret Side of the Tonkin Gulf Incident, 2. WebGulf of Tonkin Resolution, also called Tonkin Gulf Resolution, resolution put before the U.S. Congress by Pres. In fact, the North Vietnamese were trying to avoid contact with U.S. forces on August 4, and they saw the departure of the Desoto patrol ships as a sign that they could proceed to recover their torpedo boats and tow them back to base. It was 1964, an election year, and the Republicans had just nominated Barry Goldwater, a former jet fighter pilot, and hardcore hawk, to run against Johnson in November. Midday on August 1, NSGA San Miguel, the U.S. Marine Corps SIGINT detachment co-located with the U.S. Army at Phu Bai, and Maddoxs own DSU all detected the communications directing the North Vietnamese torpedo boats to depart from Haiphong on August 2. By late July 1964, SOG had four Nasty-class patrol boats, designated. Haiphong again repeated the recall order after the attack. Ticonderoga ordered four A-1H Skyraiders into the air to support the ships. Carl Otis Schuster, U.S. Navy (ret.) But only a few minutes later, McNamara was back on the line with news of a second incident in the Gulf of Tonkin. He has appeared on The History Channel as a featured expert. In any event, the attack took place in broad daylight under conditions of clear visibility. 15. Maddox detected the torpedo boats on radar at a range of almost 20,000 yards and turned away at its top speed of 32 knots. When the boats reached that point, Maddox fired three warning shots, but the torpedo boats continued inbound at high speed. At 2000 hours local time, Maddox reported it had two surface and three aerial contacts on radar. The Pyramid and All-Seeing Eye . It still is not clear whether the order was intended to halt the attack or to delay it until after nightfall, when there was a much greater chance for success. Interview, authors with James Hawes, 31 March 1996. The Dollar Bill . For some reason, however, the second Desoto Mission, to be conducted by Maddox, was not canceled, even though it was scheduled to start at the same time that a late July commando mission was being launched. Thousands of passengers are stranded after Colombias Viva Air grounds flights, The last of Mexicos artisanal salt-makers preserve a 2,000-year-old tradition, I cannot give up: Cambodian rapper says he will sing about injustice despite threats from govt, Ukrainian rock star reflects on a year of war in his country, Ukrainian refugees in Poland will now be charged to stay in state-funded housing, This Colombian town is dimming its lights to attract more tourists to view the night sky, Kneel and apologize!: 76 years after island-wide massacre, Taiwan continues to commemorate and debate the tragedy. Both boats opened fire, scoring hits on the tower, then moved on to other buildings nearby. Congress supported the resolution with Everything went smoothly until the early hours of 2 August, when intelligence picked up indications that the North Vietnamese Navy had moved additional Swatows into the vicinity of Hon Me and Hon Nieu Islands and ordered them to prepare for battle. The "nada notion" -- that nothing happened and the Gulf of Tonkin Incident was the product of inexperienced sonarmen and the overworked imagination of young deck-watch officers -- can no longer be sustained. Moreover, the subsequent review of the evidence exposed the translation and analysis errors that resulted in the reporting of the salvage operation as preparations for a second attack. These types of patrols had previously been conducted off the coasts of the Soviet Union, China, and North Korea. By then, early news accounts had already solidified some opinions, and the Johnson Administration had decided to launch retaliatory strikes. This mission coincided with several 34A attacks, including an Aug. 1 raid on Hon Me and Hon Ngu Islands. Herricks concerns grew as the SIGINT intercepts indicated that the North Vietnamese were concentrating torpedo boats off Hon Me Island, 25 nautical miles to his southwest. In response, the North Vietnamese boat launched a torpedo. By late 1958 it was obvious that a major Communist buildup was underway in South Vietnam, but the American SIGINT community was ill-placed and ill-equipped to deal with it. The Johnson Administration initially limited its response to a terse diplomatic note to Hanoi, the first-ever U.S. diplomatic note to that government. Consequently, while Maddox was in the patrol area, a South Vietnamese commando raid was underway southwest of its position. Based on the intercepts, Captain John J. Herrick, the on-scene mission commander aboard nearby Turner Joy, decided to terminate Maddoxs Desoto patrol late on August 1, because he believed he had indications the ship was about to be attacked.. He spoke out against banning girls education. Based on this, they launched the political process that led to the wars escalation. Heavy machine-gun bullets riddled PTF-6, tearing away part of the port bow and wounding four South Vietnamese crewmen, including Lieutenant Son. McNamara and the JCS believed that this intercept decisively provided the smoking gun of the second attack, and so the president reported to the American people and Congress. As Communist communications activity was rising rapidly, American senior leaders were increasing support to the South Vietnamese government. Two hours later the Phu Bai SIGINT station transmitted a critic report warning of possible [North Vietnamese] naval operations planned against the Desoto patrol. Twenty-five minutes later, Phu Bai sent a second critic report that said, imminent plans of [North Vietnamese] naval action possibly against Desoto Mission.. In this case, perception was much more important than reality.10. 2, pp. Telegram from Embassy in Vietnam to Department of State, 7 August 1964. PTF-6 took up station at the mouth of the Ron River, lit up the sky with illumination rounds, and fired at the security post. In fact, an earlier Desoto patrol planned for February had been canceled because of concerns over potential interference with South Vietnamese commando missions scheduled for the same time. With that report, after nearly four decades, the NSA officially reversed its verdict on the events of August 4, 1964, that had led that night to President Lyndon Johnsons televised message to the nation: The initial attack on the destroyer Maddox, on August 2, was repeated today by a number of hostile vessels attacking two U.S. destroyers with torpedoes. The departure of the North Vietnamese salvage tug en route to the damaged craft was reported to the American ships as a submarine chaser, not a serious threat but certainly more so than an unarmed seagoing tug. "The North Vietnamese are reacting defensively to our attacks on their offshore islands. Approved on Aug. 10, 1964, the Southeast Asia (Gulf of Tonkin) Resolution, gave Johnson the power to use military force in the region without requiring a declaration of war. 12. Herrick requested aerial reconnaissance for the next morning to search for the wreckage of the torpedo boats he thought he had sunk. As is common with specialized histories -- what I call the "tunnels of Cu Chi" syndrome -- this book will tell most readers more about the U.S. Navy in Vietnam than they care to know. Subscribe to receive our weekly newsletter with top stories from master historians. 8. The historian here is obliged to deal with two basic considerations in offering up an accounting: the event itself -- that is, what actually happened there in the waters off North Vietnam in early August 1964; and the uses made of it by President Lyndon Johnson and his administration. But in the pre-dawn hours of July 31, 1964, U.S.-backed patrol boats shelled two North Quoted in Steve Edwards, "Stalking the Enemys Coast," U.S. With a presidential election just three months away and Johnson positioning himself as the peace candidate, the administration spoke of American resolve not to react to provocation and to avoid escalation. Hanoi denied the charge that it had fired on the U.S. destroyers on 4 August, calling the charge "an impudent fabrication. Listen to McNamara's conversation with Johnson. The North Vietnamese turned for shore with the Maddox in pursuit. The tug departed Haiphong at approximately 0100 hours on August 4, while the undamaged torpedo boat, T-146, was ordered to stay with the crippled boats and maintain an alert for enemy forces. At about 0600, the two U.S. destroyers resumed the Desoto patrol. "1 Most of these would be shore bombardment. At this point, U.S. involvement in Vietnam remained largely in the background. 10. No actual visual sightings by Maddox.". WebLyndon Johnson signed the Tonkin Gulf resolution on August 10, 1964. The most comprehensive and authoritative history site on the Internet. There was more or less general acceptance of the Navy's initial account -- there was an unprovoked attack on Aug. 2 by three North Vietnamese patrol boats on an American warship, the destroyer USS Maddox in international waters. Unlike much else that followed, this incident is undisputed, although no one from the US government ever admitted publicly that the attack was likely provoked by its covert actions. 313-314. THIS SECOND volume of the U.S. Navy's multivolume history of the Vietnam War is bound in the same familiar rich blue buckram that has styled official Navy histories since the Civil War and hence resembles its predecessors. WebNational Security Agency/Central Security Service > Home The bullets struck the destroyer; the torpedo missed. By then, the two American ships were approximately 80 nautical miles from the nearest North Vietnamese coastline and steaming southeast at 20 knots. George C. Herring, ed., The Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War: The Negotiating Volumes of the Pentagon Papers (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1983), p. 18. 13. Suns and Stars They arrived on station overhead by 2100 hours. William Conrad Gibbons, The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War, Part II, 1961-1964, pp. The boats followed at their maximum speed of 44 knots, continuing the chase for more than 20 minutes. Operations Security (OPSEC) concerns and related communications restrictions prevented Maddox and its operational commanders up to the Seventh Fleet from knowing of the commando raid. The Gulf of Tonkin incident was a complex naval event in the Gulf of Tonkin, off the coast of Vietnam, that was presented to the U.S. Congress on August 5, 1964, as two unprovoked attacks by North Vietnamese torpedo boats on the destroyers Maddox and Turner Joy of the U.S. To the northwest, though they could not see it in the blackness, was Hon Me; to the southwest lay Hon Nieu. The Gulf of Tonkin Incident famously gave the Johnson Administration the justification they needed to escalate the Vietnam War. The series of mistakes that led to the August 4 misreporting began on August 3 when the Phu Bai station interpreted Haiphongs efforts to determine the status of its forces as an order to assemble for further offensive operations. Both U.S. ships opened fire on the radar contacts, but reported problems maintaining a lock on the tracking and fire control solution. History is a guide to navigation in perilous times. AND THERE is the fact of Vietnam's position today. Message, COMUSMACV 291233Z July 1964, CP 291345Z July 1964. 136-137. The Maddox was attacked at 1600. Even in the darkness, the commandos could see their targeta water tower surrounded by a few military buildings. The fig leaf of plausible denial served McNamara in this case, but it was scant cover. So, whether by accident or design, American actions in the Tonkin Gulf triggered a response from the North Vietnamese, not the other way around. Summary Notes of the 538th Meeting of the NSC, 4 August 1964, 6:15-6:40 p.m., Foreign Relations of the United States 1964-1968, vol. The rounds set some of the buildings ablaze, keeping the defenders off balance. This time, however, President Johnson reacted much more skeptically and ultimately decided to take no retaliatory action. But Morse did not know enough about the program to ask pointed questions. But, to me, the more pernicious deception was this idea that American ships were sailing innocently in the Gulf of Tonkin and were attacked without provocation, he continues. Until 1964, Desoto patrols stayed at least 20 miles away from the coast. Westmoreland reported that although he was not absolutely certain why the Swatows were shifted south, the move "could be attributable to recent successful [34A] operations.